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Abstract 
 
This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in 
presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the 
structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four 
East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select 
ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for 
several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests 
that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking 
responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, 
in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of 
competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have 
important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, 
demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence.  
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 Introduction  
Cabinet ministers play a central role in policy formulation and implementation of every 
democratic government. Existing studies of government formation in presidential systems have 
examined executive appointments mainly in the context of a president's legislative strategy. 
Presidents are more likely to appoint partisan ministers when they have limited policymaking 
power in order to strengthen support for their policy agenda (Amorim Neto 2006). When the 
ruling party does not control a legislative majority, presidents tend to concede cabinet posts to 
other parties, thereby forming executive coalitions (Cheibub 2007). When presidents have 
effective control of their party, they are more likely to appoint copartisans versus nonpartisans to 
the cabinet (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015).  
 Recent emerging literature on presidential cabinet appointments has begun exploring the 
rationale of choosing ministers beyond partisanship. The selection of so-called "nonpartisans" to 
cabinets provides presidents with certain advantages for managing their policy programs. 
Presidents can enjoy a high degree of ministerial loyalty by naming nonpartisan ministers as their 
appointments are not tied to the cabinet's legislative support (Dowding and Dumont 2009). 
Moreover, by appointing nonpartisan ministers, presidents can take advantage of their policy 
expertise since professional background and technical skill are typical selection criteria for 
nonpartisans in the recruitment process. Nonpartisans are therefore prevalent in presidential 
cabinets and composed of individuals with diverse backgrounds (Amorim Neto and Samuels 
2010; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Despite the significant contribution of the recent research 
on nonpartisan ministers, overlooked in this literature is a president's delegation concerns in 
policy implementation. In particular, there has been little comparative study of how presidents 
can employ cabinet resources to monitor and control bureaucrats. 
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 This article fills this gap by examining the role of presidential cabinet appointments in 
controlling the bureaucracy in East Asia.1 In East Asia, where a majority of democracies have 
popularly elected presidents, there is wide cross-country variation in the proportion of ministers 
who are selected from the bureaucracy. To account for this variation, I build my theoretical 
framework on the "administrative presidency" approach (Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008, 2011; Moe 
1985b; Nathan 1983; Rudalevige 2005; Waterman 1989), focusing on how presidents exert one 
of their important powers – the authority to staff top executive posts in the bureaucracy – to 
influence policy implementation and make agencies serve them. 2
 In this article, I explore how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the 
bureaucracy itself can shape presidential cabinet appointment decisions. Focusing on the 
institutional aspects of bureaucratic structure, I demonstrate that presidents face different types 
of administrative challenges according to how civil servants are recruited and promoted in the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Adopting the Weberian conceptualization of meritocratic civil service as 
a spectrum, there are professionalized systems characterized by merit-based recruitment and 
predictable procedures for promotion at one end, while politicized systems, at the other end, use 
political affiliation as the key selection criterion for executive posts. In a professionalized 
 As shown in the data 
description below, presidents in East Asia have systematically selected ministers from either 
inside or outside the bureaucracy depending on the bureaucratic structure they face; incentives 
for selecting one type of minister over the other have also differed across countries and evolved 
over time.  
                                                          
1 See Baum (2011) for the use of administrative procedure acts as a mechanism for controlling bureaucracy in the 
East Asian context. 
2 Among the definitions of politicization, recruitment-related definition is most clear and commonly referenced. 
Some definitions in this perspective are "party political favouritism in recruitment and promotion of civil servants" 
(Ståhlberg 1987, 368) and "the [political leader's] act of increasing the number and penetration of appointees" 
(Lewis 2008, 2). 
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bureaucracy, presidents have a sizable pool of talent but should be concerned about career 
bureaucrats' programmatic support for their policy agenda. On the other hand, facing a 
politicized bureaucracy, presidents have more direct influence over the civil service but should 
be concerned about a lower level of professional expertise. By applying this approach to the East 
Asian context, where there is considerable variation in the institutional characteristics of 
bureaucracy, we can observe whether presidents adjust their cabinet appointments to deal with 
the common trade-off between responsiveness and competence in a transitional bureaucracy 
(Aberbach and Rockman 1994; Hojnacki 1996).  
 In describing the importance of controlling government agencies via a president's cabinet 
appointments, I examine presidential choice of ministers from within or outside the civil service 
in 21 administrations of four East Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and 
Indonesia) for over two decades. My analyses of original datasets show that presidents are more 
likely to choose ministers from the civil service when bureaucracies are professionalized, but are 
less likely to do so in politicized civil service systems. Relying on qualitative interviews and case 
studies, I provide further evidence about the appointment mechanism for agency control. In 
professionalized systems, where chief executives enjoy a sizable pool of talent but need to 
enhance responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. 
On the other hand, in politicized systems, where chief executives easily obtain responsiveness 
but face a low degree of competence, presidents tend to seek experts from outside the 
bureaucracy for cabinet appointments.  
 My analysis makes important contributions to the literature on regulatory governance as 
well as comparative politics. First, this study speaks to the emerging literature on the role of 
nonpartisans in government with a new approach by clearly showing how existing variation in 
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the institutional characteristics of bureaucracy affects presidential choice of ministers from inside 
or outside the bureaucracy. Second, by analyzing an administrative dimension in cabinet choices 
of East Asian presidential democracies that have been rarely studied in comparative perspective, 
this study contributes new evidence to the debate over who controls the bureaucracy and how, 
extending this research beyond the context of American politics.  
 In the next section, I discuss the delegation problems presidents face in controlling 
bureaucrats and explore political appointments as solutions, drawing on the "administrative 
presidency" approach in American politics. I then outline my theoretical framework which 
leverages variation in the institutional structure of the bureaucracy and suggest that certain 
bureaucratic structures, such as professionalized or politicized systems, pose different types of 
administrative challenges and shape presidential incentives to choose ministers from inside or 
outside the civil service. After analyzing these hypothesized relationships, I discuss my findings 
and draw conclusions regarding cross-case variation in bureaucratic structure and presidential 
choice of nonpartisan ministers.    
 
Delegation Problems and Appointment Mechanism for Agency Control  
 
In contemporary democracies, citizens elect representatives to the government, and civil servants 
implement policy on behalf of the elected officials. This basic principal-agent framework 
provides insight into the policy process: from voters (principals) all the way to bureaucrats as 
ultimate agents who formulate and implement policy (Strøm 2000). This framework is 
particularly useful to compare parliamentary and presidential democracies, the two common and 
pure types of democratic regimes, because it allows us to identify the circumstances where 
agency problems are more likely to happen. As illustrated in Figure 1, the political processes of 
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the two systems described into delegation mechanisms display a clear contrast. While a 
principal-agent relationship in parliamentary democracy is linked in a single chain of delegation 
from voters to executive agencies (Strøm 2000), presidential democracy features a more 
complicated delegation sequence from citizens to civil servants (Shugart 2006).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 In Figure 1, two discrete steps in the processes are notable as major points of difference 
between the two systems. First, voters in parliamentary democracies have single agents as they 
elect their own representatives to a parliament, whereas voters in presidential democracies 
generally have multiple competing agents as they separately elect legislators and presidents who 
represent a different set of voters. Second, civil servants in parliamentary democracies have 
single principals, their respective cabinet ministers, and are simply accountable to their heads in 
the department.3
 The question of who controls executive agencies under multiple-principal conditions has 
long been debated among scholars of American politics. The ongoing discussion makes it clear 
that no single player is dominant as a principal, and no single control mechanism in operation is 
 However, civil servants in presidential democracies have multiple principals 
who may place conflicting demands in an attempt to hold their agents accountable (Moe and 
Caldwell 1994; Strøm 2000). The rest of this section further elaborates on the latter point in 
order to discuss the mechanisms of controlling civil servants in presidential democracies.  
                                                          
3 Deviation from the Westminster model also generates multiple principals to agents in parliamentary democracy. In 
a coalition government, a common type of parliamentary government where a prime minister has to select cabinet 
ministers from coalition partners, how to hold civil servants accountable is a primary concern for the chief executive. 
Often, delegation to coalition partners may lead to high costs that a prime minister suffers due to the divergence of 
preferences and the difficulty of sanctions against coalition members (see Strøm 2000; Thies 2001). 
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most effective in the political process.4
 According to the "administrative presidency" model developed by scholars of American 
politics, presidents seek to strategically enhance personnel responsiveness as well as 
organizational competence of bureaucracies and guide career civil servants to meet their political 
objectives (Heclo 1977; Moe 1985b; Nathan 1983; Rudalevige 2005). One typical approach is 
politicization, whereby presidents can increase the number and location of administrative 
positions occupied by their appointees in the executive branch and rely more on the personnel 
(Lewis 2008; Moe 1985b; Rudalevige 2002; Weingast 2005).
 The fact that presidents compete against the legislature 
for the accountability of executive agencies but are typically held accountable for the 
performance of the whole government has a significant implication for executive control of the 
bureaucracy (Moe 1985b): Chief executives will exert considerable effort to influence policy 
implementation by employing their central authority to fill top executive posts (Lewis 2008, 
2011; Waterman 1989). The question is, how do presidential appointments help them to gain 
control of executive agencies?  
5
                                                          
4 The long and inconclusive debate on this topic has resulted in a broad array of studies on political control of the 
bureaucracy, from  the Congressional dominance argument to the presidential control and autonomous bureaucracy 
arguments. In terms of control mechanisms, they include ex ante tools such as appointments, administrative 
procedures, executive orders, and legislation as well as ex post instruments such as oversight, judicial review of 
agency rulings, and budgets.  
 Politicization is particularly 
attractive to chief executives as a control mechanism because the power of appointment, 
anchored in a formal presidential power, provides more leverage in personnel management vis-à-
vis any other authority granted to chief executives. Presidents can take direct action to shore up 
responsiveness by appointing people based on loyalty or may improve competence by stressing 
policy expertise in appointments (Moe 1985b, 245).  
5 The other approach is centralization, whereby presidents create and expand parts of the executive branch that are 
most closely allied with them (e.g., Executive Office of the President) and then give their policy staff a central role. 
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 This line of reasoning, based on the U.S. presidency literature, suggests political 
appointments are a particularly effective strategy for presidents in influencing agency behavior 
and policy outcomes. First, presidents find that expectations surrounding their performance are 
often greater than their authority and institutional capacity (Cronin 1975; Lowi 1985; Moe 1985b; 
Neustadt [1960] 1990). Given this imbalance, presidents have strong incentives to enhance their 
capacity by initiating reforms and making adjustments in the administrative apparatus around 
them. However, in acting upon these incentives, presidents find that their resources are wholly 
inadequate as they are constrained by stumbling blocks, such as political and bureaucratic 
opposition, institutional inertia, and time pressures (Moe 1985b, 240-244). Second, in the 
organizational perspective, executive agencies seem embedded within the executive branch. Yet, 
the agencies are not under the entire control of the chief executive but are rather caught in 
between the president and the legislature that often disagree about the evaluation of an agency's 
performance and the direction of any policy change by the agency (Weingast 2005). For 
presidents, it is difficult to persuade legislative members to support their policy but also tough to 
induce relevant agencies to follow executive directions faithfully under multiple principals 
(Nathan 1983, 2). More importantly, the role of political appointees has proven effective and 
consequential in executive control of agency behavior (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; 
Moe 1982, 1985a; Wood 1990; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994). Political appointees in top 
executive positions, which require decision-making and management abilities in the policy 
process, can change agencies and substantially affect policy outcomes (Lewis 2008). Ideally, 
having political appointees allows a steady infusion of talent, ensures an influx of new ideas, and 
counteracts inertia (Bok 2003, 265). In sum, it is the inadequacy of institutional capacity in the 
presidency, a conflict of interest within the executive branch, and the key role of political 
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appointees that generate the appointment mechanism for agency control we observe in 
presidential democracies. 
 
Presidential Control of Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective 
Although the discussion in the previous section provides important insights into the role of 
political appointments as potential solutions to agency problems, all of this literature is based on 
the premise that presidents will choose top executive appointees from their ideological allies, 
given the static nature of American bureaucracy. Yet, existing variation in the structure of the 
bureaucracy across countries produces an additional dimension to presidential personnel 
distribution, positing different types of administrative challenges to presidents of other nations. 
Despite the important role of political appointments in controlling agency behavior in 
presidential democracies, there has been little comparative research on this subject.  
 Prior neglect of an administrative dimension from the discussion of presidential cabinet 
appointments in the comparative literature is understandable. In Latin America, where 
presidentialism is the central aspect of its constitutional history and the dominant body of 
comparative research on presidential cabinet formation has emerged, central bureaucracies are 
staffed mostly by those who lack professional qualifications (Riggs 2009).6
                                                          
6 Two common types of bureaucrats in Latin America are retainers – long-term employees with no qualifications – 
and politicos – short-term employees with no qualifications (Riggs 2009, 157-158).  
 Without sufficient 
variation in bureaucratic structure across the region, scholars of cabinet studies, when accounting 
for nonpartisan appointments, might have not paid particular attention to the relationship 
between the characteristics of bureaucratic structures presidents face and their choice of 
9 
 
nonpartisans from the civil service.7
 In this article, I argue that the key institutional characteristics of bureaucracy – how civil 
servants are recruited and promoted – shape presidential incentives to appoint cabinet ministers 
to whom they delegate authority to control bureaucrats. In describing the main features of 
different personnel systems across bureaucracies, I adopt the "Weberianness Scale," a simple 
measure of the degree to which civil service systems are characterized by merit-based 
recruitment and predictable procedures for promotion (Evans and Rauch 1999). At one end of 
the scale, a highly professionalized bureaucracy is characterized by "meritocratic recruitment 
through competitive examinations," "civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than 
political appointments and dismissals," and "filling higher levels of the hierarchy through 
internal promotion" (Rauch and Evans 2000, 50-51). At the other end, a highly politicized 
bureaucracy utilizes political affiliation as the key selection criterion for executive posts 
throughout the organization hierarchy, giving chief executives vast influence over the agencies 
through hiring and firing political appointees. Across the continuum of personnel systems, 
presidents face different types of agency problems ranging from responsiveness to competence. 
Presidents enjoy a sizeable pool of talented personnel in professionalized bureaucracies which 
tend to be insulated from political influence. In contrast, presidents may wield extensive control 
over politicized bureaucracies while suffering these agencies' "lower human capital" and "greater 
 In contrast, a broad spectrum exists in professionalization 
among bureaucratic structures in East Asia, and such variation may affect presidential incentives 
to select nonpartisan ministers from inside versus outside the bureaucracy. What we need is a 
comparative framework that explains how such variation in bureaucratic systems accounts for 
variation in presidential patterns of appointing top agents.  
                                                          
7 Such literature defines nonpartisans as either "technocrats" who have an independent policy agenda or "outsiders" 
who are personally loyal to the chief executive (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015, 317) but makes no clear 
connections between these appointees and the characteristics of bureaucratic structures.  
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difficulty with recruitment and retention of high-capacity bureaucrats" (Krause, Lewis, and 
Douglas 2006, 772).   
 Presidents, facing these two contrasting types of bureaucracies, will make different 
appointment decisions for agency control. In professionalized bureaucracies, a sizable pool of 
competent civil servants provides clear opportunities for presidents to efficiently accomplish 
their policy goals. However, presidents also want their policies implemented closely in line with 
their preferences (Dowding and Dumont 2009, 2014; Hahm, Jung, and Lee 2013). As 
bureaucracies are more professionalized, civil servants, who are likely to stay in the government 
longer than their chief executives, may have weaker incentives to align with presidential policy 
preferences. One way to handle this problem is through selectively promoting senior civil 
servants who are ideologically compatible with the chief executive. The choice of the so-called 
"administrative loyalists" (Nathan 1983; Weingast 2005; Wilson 1989) as cabinet ministers helps 
presidents to manage agency behavior in a twofold way. First, since these administrative 
loyalists are reliable agents as well as professionals in their fields, presidents can empower them 
to deliver chief executives' policy commitments. Second, given their experience and long-term 
careers within the organization, administrative loyalists are better positioned to manage rank-
and-file civil servants in merit-based bureaucracies on a president's behalf (Evans and Rauch 
1999; Jung, Moon, and Hahm 2008). Therefore, by promoting these administrative loyalists into 
top executive positions, presidents can expect to enhance responsiveness while taking advantage 
of the talent pool.  
 By contrast, presidents can enjoy vast influence over the organization in politicized 
bureaucracies. In cases where political appointments run deep into the organization hierarchy, 
presidents gain direct and greater control over the bureaucracy. Yet, they also encounter the 
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dilemma of a limited pool of competence within the bureaucracy. Under a system based on ad 
hoc criteria, it is difficult to bring individual motivations in line with organizational, long-term 
goals (Evans and Rauch 1999), which implies a lower chance of effectiveness in bureaucratic 
performance. Politicizing recruitments and promotions means that a large number of civil 
servants are likely to leave once newly elected presidents take office. Irregular hiring and 
promotion standards as well as unpredictable career trajectories will further deter civil servants 
from putting much effort into policy implementation. Hence, it is relatively rare to see high-
capacity bureaucrats promoted into top executive positions in highly politicized systems. In most 
cases, chief executives in these systems will recruit executive talent by staffing the cabinet with 
experts from outside the bureaucracy.  
 In sum, I predict that there will be significantly more ministers from the civil service in 
professionalized systems than in politicized systems. This line of logic leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
As bureaucracies are more professionalized, presidents are more likely to appoint ministers from 
the civil service; when civil service systems are more politicized, presidents are more likely to 
appoint ministers from outside the bureaucracy. 
 
 
 In general, democratic presidents are motivated by broader policy concerns when they 
choose whom to run their ministries and treat the state bureaucracy as an organization to help 
advance their policy goals. In this sense, I assume that presidents consider the administrative 
dimension in cabinet choices to manage their delegation concerns in policy implementation. In 
achieving their administrative purposes, each appointment decision is a trade-off between 
responsiveness and competence, and its scope depends on the degree of professionalization in 
bureaucratic structure. Although the staffing of top executive posts provides only a partial picture 
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of presidential efforts to contain the risk of agency loss in delegating policy implementation, a 
comparative analysis of the institutional characteristics of bureaucracy in East Asian presidential 
democracies will still contribute new evidence to our knowledge of a president's strategic 
appointment decisions.  
 
Data and Method 
In this section, I empirically test my hypothesis using original data collected for quantitative 
analysis. The central argument points to the importance of variables that affect presidential 
incentives to appoint cabinet ministers to accomplish their competing goals in public 
administration. To test the proposed hypothesis, I constructed an original dataset of presidential 
cabinets and ministers in East Asia through several criteria. First, the Polity score, which lists a 
political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as democracy, is used to determine a set of presidential 
democracies in East Asia and the respective beginning year of democracy for these cases.8 I then 
chose all cases where the country's constitution grants presidents the authority to appoint and 
dismiss ministers (Hicken and Kasuya 2003; Shugart and Carey 1992).9 The dataset includes 21 
administrations in four East Asian presidential democracies for the following periods: South 
Korea (1988-2013), Taiwan (1993-2013), the Philippines (1986-2013), and Indonesia (1999-
2013).10
                                                          
8 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
 Second, within these cases, the composition of the cabinet with a list of ministers was 
observed with information from the CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of 
Foreign Governments and the Political Handbook of the World. Information on the backgrounds 
9 Mongolia and East Timor were excluded due to the limited power of presidents over cabinet formation.  
10 Indonesia before 2005 and Taiwan before 1997 are not pure presidential democracies as Presidents Abdurrahman 
Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-04) of Indonesia and President Lee Teng-hui (1993-1996) of 
Taiwan were not directly elected by the national constituency. I test whether my results are robust after excluding 
these periods and running the same analysis with directly-elected presidents only.  
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of ministers was collected from academic publications, local archives, news reports, and 
websites.11 Since restructuring of the executive branch occurred in some administrations, I used 
the organization chart described on the official government websites of each case to obtain 
information about the size of cabinets.12
 The main dependent variable, Ministers from Civil Service, is the proportion of ministers 
from the civil service in the cabinet, which is recorded based on the yearly observation of cabinet 
composition for each country. It is defined as ministers who took career-track positions in the 
civil service through national exams or open recruitment and served as a career civil servant 
prior to cabinet appointment.
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 Figure 2 presents data on this variable from 21 administrations in 
four East Asian presidential democracies. It clearly demonstrates that there is systematic 
variation across four cases: Career civil servants are markedly more prevalent in South Korean 
and Taiwanese cabinets than Philippine and Indonesian cabinets. On average, the cross-country 
variation ranges from the lows of 8.5 percent (Indonesia) and 10 percent (Philippines) to the 
highs of Taiwan (23.5 percent) and South Korea (36.1 percent). Although there is some within-
country variation, these trends are generally consistent across the observations of presidential 
administrations in each case. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
11 See a list of sources in the appendix. 
12 In Indonesia, the size of cabinets ranges from 29 to 35; in the Philippines, from 21 to 24; in South Korea, from 16 
to 25; and in Taiwan, from 29 to 34. The dataset includes all portfolios in the cabinet except independent agencies, 
where agency heads have a fixed term and are not affected by cabinet reshuffle decisions (e.g., Central Bank and 
Central Election Commission). See a list of ministries in the appendix. 
13 For details of civil service recruitment in East Asia, see Berman (2011), Berman, Moon, and Choi (2010), and 
Moon and Hwang (2013). 
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 The key independent variable is Bureaucracy Quality which measures the degree to 
which the state bureaucracy tends to be autonomous and run by a transparent and rule-bound 
mechanism for hiring and promotion. The original data are from ratings by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of "Bureaucratic Quality," one of the indicators of the Quality of 
Government. The scale runs from 0 to 4, with the highest marks given to countries where the 
national bureaucracy is autonomous, transparent, and operates under clear rules for employing 
and advancing personnel, whereas countries which lack the buffering effect of a professionalized 
bureaucracy and tend to be interrupted by political pressure in policy implementation receive low 
points.14 ICRG ratings on bureaucratic quality, previously used for research on the performance 
of the national bureaucracy (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995), are regularly updated and recorded 
based on the yearly observation of bureaucratic structure in the world. For this analysis, I use a 
scale from 0 to 1, normalized from the original 0-4 scale by the Quality of Government 
Institute.15
 In addition, I also use indices of bureaucratic structure by Rauch and Evans (2000) as a 
benchmark against ratings from the ICRG on bureaucratic quality. The bureaucratic structure 
indices, employed as an alternative measure for robustness, are constructed based on survey 
responses from country experts.  I adopt two indices – Merit (the extent to which recruitment is 
meritocratic at the entry level, ranging 0-1) and Career (the extent of internal promotion, ranging 
0-1) – and sum up each of these index scores within my respective countries (see Rauch and 
  
                                                          
14 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. ICRG methodology describes how to measure ratings on bureaucratic 
quality as follows: "The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to 
minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 
government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political 
pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning 
effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of 
policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions (http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ 
icrgmethodology.pdf)." 
15 http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.  
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Evans 2000, 54-56). Likewise, high points should be given to countries where the national 
bureaucracy is characterized by "meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations, 
civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than political appointments and dismissals, 
and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through internal promotion" (Rauch and Evans 2000, 
50-51).  
 Figure 3 displays the simple bivariate correlation between ICRG ratings on bureaucratic 
quality and the proportion of ministers from the civil service. The scatter plot indicates a positive 
relationship lending support for my hypothesis: As bureaucracies are more professionalized, 
there are more ministers from the civil service in presidential cabinets; when bureaucracies are 
more politicized, there are fewer ministers from the civil service in the cabinet. This hypothesis 
will be tested through more sophisticated multivariate analyses, but Figure 3 provides initial 
support for my argument. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 I further control for six variables that may affect presidential strategy for appointing 
cabinet ministers. These can be broadly categorized as constitutional powers, partisan strength, 
and political and economic contexts. The first control variable, Constitutional Powers, measures 
formal powers granted to the president. It is a common parameter of presidential power and may 
have a positive impact on the appointment of ministers from the civil service. Presidents who 
have a powerful formal authority to enact bills unilaterally may have stronger incentives to focus 
on policy implementation, thereby choosing more ministers with professional backgrounds such 
as civil service experience (see Amorim Neto 2006). I adopt the classification by Shugart and 
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Carey (1992) and apply their ordinal scales to information from the constitutions of the four East 
Asian democracies and other academic sources. This classification divides the formal powers 
into two categories – legislative and non-legislative powers – which have multiple types of 
powers within each category. The overall measure is the sum of the individual scores (ranging 
from 0 to 4) of each subtype of powers within the two categories.16
 The second control variable, Presidents' Support in Legislature, measures a president's 
partisan powers based on their capacity to shape or dominate the policymaking process that 
emanates from the president's standing in relation to the party system (Shugart and Mainwaring 
1997). The president's ability to achieve their political agenda relies on the approval of a 
majority of legislative members (Cox and Morgenstern 2002). It is likely to have a positive 
relationship with the appointment of ministers from the civil service. When their party controls a 
legislative majority, presidents have weaker incentives to concede cabinet posts to form a 
coalition government (Cheibub, 2007) and have more leeway to work toward managing policy 
performance by appointing more professional ministers such as career civil servants. As a 
measure of a president's partisan strength, I employ the proportion of seats occupied by the 
president's party in the lower or only chamber.  
 The measure ranges from 9 
(Indonesia) to 21.5 (South Korea). 
 The final four control variables relate to political and economic contexts: Electoral Cycle, 
Term Limits, Inflation, and Age of Democracy. The third control variable, Electoral Cycle, 
measures the number of months left until the end of the president's current term of office. It is 
likely to have a negative relationship with the appointment of ministers with civil service 
backgrounds, because the political dynamics of executive-legislative relations are shaped by the 
fixed electoral calendar and shift over the course of the president's term (Altman 2000). Newly 
                                                          
16 See Shugart and Carey (1992, 150) for details. 
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inaugurated presidents enjoy a presidential honeymoon and may want to push new agendas with 
party-affiliated people in the cabinet, whereas presidents at later stages in their terms tend to 
stabilize an administration and will try to avoid becoming a lame duck by appointing ministers 
from the civil service (see Altman 2000; Martínez-Gallardo 2012, 2014). The fourth control 
variable, Term Limits, measures whether a president can run for re-election or not. The 
president's appointment strategy also depends on the limit of presidential terms because 
presidents limited to a single term (South Korea and the Philippines) are likely to have different 
appointment approaches from two-term presidents who can seek re-election (Taiwan and 
Indonesia). This is a dichotomous variable which gives 1 if presidents are eligible for re-election, 
and 0 otherwise. It is likely to be negatively associated with the appointment of ministers from 
the civil service, because presidents who can run for re-election have stronger incentives to hire 
more party-affiliated ministers to shore up the support of the legislature or their own party. I also 
control for Inflation using the monthly change in the consumer price index.17
 
 As observed in the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, presidents tend to increase the number of technocratic ministers in 
response to economic calamity. Adopting the proxy measure used to account for this possibility 
(e.g., Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015), I control for this economic context factor in the 
analysis. Finally, I also control for Age of Democracy, which is the number of years since the 
country’s democratic transition, because new democracies with an immature party system can be 
more conducive to nonpartisanship in the cabinet (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). If this is truly 
what happens in East Asia, it is likely to be positively correlated with the appointment of 
nonpartisan professionals with civil service backgrounds. Table 1 provides summary statistics for 
the independent and control variables included in the analysis.  
                                                          
17 https://www.ceicdata.com/en/statistics/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 As displayed in Figures 2 and 3 above, my sample includes yearly observations on four 
cases for more than two decades on average. To estimate the proportion of ministers from the 
civil service, I use general linear models, which address estimation issues concerning the time-
series cross-sectional structure of the dataset (Zorn 2001).18
 
 These models are widely used to 
estimate cabinet formation for proportion data (e.g., Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). I estimate robust 
standard errors with first-order autocorrelation correction within each panel to account for the 
possibility of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation issues. For robustness checks, I run the same 
analysis with individual-level data, including 1,257 ministers across the four East Asian 
countries between 1986 and 2013, using logistic regression models to estimate the likelihood of 
ministers from the civil service being present in the cabinet. In these additional models, I use a 
dichotomous variable (1 if ministers are from the civil service; 0 otherwise) as my dependent 
variable and estimate robust standard errors clustered on each country. 
Findings and Analysis 
Table 2 shows estimated coefficients of bureaucratic quality and control variables from the 
multivariate regression analysis. In Model 1, I test my hypothesis using a general linear model to 
measure the proportion of ministers from the civil service in presidential cabinets. In Model 2, I 
run the same model, substituting the Rauch and Evans index as the key independent variable on 
                                                          
18 The generalized least-squares (GLS) estimator of the random effects model is close in spirit to the fixed effects 
model. With time averages of the regressors in the panel model, efficient GLS estimation can lead to estimators that 
equal the fixed effects estimators (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 719). In my analysis, each of the independent 
variables based on monthly observations for original data is now averaged per year within the variable. 
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bureaucratic quality for the ICRG ratings. As indicated above, the Rauch and Evans index is 
used as a benchmark against the ICRG ratings. The inclusion of the Rauch and Evans index, 
however, causes the number of cases to drop to three due to unavailability of information on 
Indonesia. Models 3 and 4 test the proposed hypothesis using logistic models to estimate the 
likelihood of ministers from the civil service being present in the cabinet. Each model runs the 
same analysis with the ICRG ratings (Model 3) and the Rauch and Evans index (Model 4) as my 
main independent variable. This modeling decision allows for checking the robustness of the 
results in Models 1 and 2.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 The results from Table 2 support my prediction about how bureaucratic quality shapes 
presidential strategy for appointing cabinet ministers. In Model 1, the effect of the ICRG ratings 
on bureaucratic quality is positive and statistically significant. For an increase in the normalized 
score of the ICRG ratings from its observed minimum to maximum values, there is an expected 
increase of 4.3 ministers from the civil service in the cabinet on average (15.6 percent of the 
average size of the cabinet), holding all other variables constant. 19  This finding therefore 
supports my hypothesis.20
 Figure 4 illustrates the predicted effect of increasing professionalization in bureaucratic 
structure, indicating that these characteristics positively affect presidential appointments of 
ministers from the civil service. When the degree of professionalization is low and political 
  
                                                          
19 The average size of the cabinet is 27.25 which is based on the size of the cabinet formed at the beginning of the 
term in the most recent administrations, as of 2013, from four East Asian democracies: South Korea (17), Taiwan 
(34), the Philippines (23), and Indonesia (35). 
20 The model excluding indirectly-elected presidents (Indonesia before 2005 and Taiwan before 1997) produced 
substantively similar results. 
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affiliation is the main selection criterion for executive posts, there is a low proportion of 
ministers promoted from the bureaucracy. On the other hand, in professionalized bureaucracies 
that utilize merit-based recruitment through competitive examinations and civil service 
procedures for hiring and firing, there is a high proportion of ministers recruited from the 
bureaucracy.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
 Model 2 is similar to Model 1 but includes the Rauch and Evans index as the key 
independent variable on bureaucratic quality. In Model 2, the effect of the Rauch and Evans 
index of bureaucratic structure is positive and statistically significant. For an increase in the 
score from its observed minimum to maximum values, there is an expected increase of 7.3 
ministers from the civil service in the cabinet on average (26.8 percent of the average size of the 
cabinet), holding all control variables constant. This finding confirms the result from Model 1 
and provides further support for my hypothesis.  
 Models 3 and 4 test the hypothesis employing logistic models for dichotomous outcomes. 
I report these models here in order to compare with the results in Models 1 and 2 and check their 
robustness. In Model 3, the coefficient estimate of the ICRG ratings is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that the presence of ministers from the civil service is more likely in 
presidential cabinets as bureaucracies are more professionalized. Likewise, the coefficient of the 
Rauch and Evans index is positive and statistically significant in Model 4, indicating that as civil 
service systems are more autonomous and established, we are more likely to observe ministers 
with civil service career backgrounds in the cabinet.  
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 The six control variables have the predicted effects, but only a few of the coefficients 
consistently reach statistical significance across models in Table 2. First, the effect of 
Constitutional Powers is positive and statistically significant in most model specifications. 
Presidents have more leeway to focus on policy effectiveness when they have a strong formal 
authority in policymaking, which leads to increased appointments of ministers from the civil 
service. Second, in Models 3 and 4, I find that newly inaugurated presidents are less likely to 
include ministers with civil service backgrounds in the cabinet, whereas presidents at the later 
stages of their terms are more likely to choose ministers from the civil service. The political 
dynamics of executive-legislative relations, which change over the electoral cycle, are indeed 
proven to affect the president's appointment strategy. While other control variables related to 
political and economic contexts, such as Term Limits, Inflation, and Age of Democracy, also 
attain statistical significance, these variables perform inconsistently across different model 
specifications. 
 
Explaining Ministers' Ideologies and Backgrounds: Interviews and Case Studies 
The results in Table 2 are based on the estimation of the proportion of ministers from the civil 
service being positively associated with bureaucratic quality. However, the logic behind my 
argument is more specific concerning ministers' ideologies and backgrounds. My prediction is 
that, when choosing nonpartisan ministers, presidents tend to promote senior civil servants who 
are ideologically compatible with them in professionalized systems; in politicized systems, 
presidents tend to select policy experts from outside the bureaucracy. Therefore, I further analyze 
the process of selecting individual ministers when presidents are faced with the two contrasting 
types of civil service systems. For this analysis, I rely on personal interviews with ministers and 
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case studies as well as my original individual-level data. In this section, I first describe the key 
institutional features of the civil service system in each case and discuss the type of agency 
problem presidents tend to face in controlling bureaucrats. I then provide an explanation of 
ministerial appointment patterns in each country since its democratic transition. 
 Among the four East Asian cases discussed in this article, there is considerable variation 
in the degree of professionalization in bureaucratic structure. While South Korea and Taiwan are 
characterized by well-established bureaucracies, Indonesia and the Philippines have civil service 
systems that depend more on political influence in their recruitment and promotion processes. A 
merit-based career civil service system was institutionalized in South Korea long before its 
democratization in 1987 (Rho and Lee 2010). Taiwan's civil service system is also based on 
merit-based recruitment and promotion (Cheng and Haggard 2001). In contrast, the Philippine 
system has been highly responsive and relatively subservient to the political leadership (Cariño 
1992; Endriga 2001). Indonesia's civil service is in transition after democratization, striving for 
the establishment of a more institutionalized body but still being characterized by a complicated 
accountability mechanism for human resource management.  
 With this array of professionalization in bureaucratic structure, we can observe how such 
variation poses different types of administrative challenges for presidents in East Asia. South 
Korea's civil service system, which is well-known for its high levels of professional competence, 
has the problem of bureaucratic rigidity emerging after democratization. Taiwan's merit-based 
personnel administration system has generated an intra-branch conflict with democratic 
presidents who saw administrative reforms against the closed nature of civil service as inevitable 
after democratic transition. In contrast, in the Philippines, political interference results in more 
direct control over bureaucrats, but it also causes governance issues, thereby serving as 
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stumbling blocks to government performance (Berman 2011). In Indonesia's current system, 
characterized by no established mechanism to centralize personnel choices with transparent 
standards in employee selection, presidents have huge room for political interference but need to 
make reform efforts for improving the accountability of personnel management (Moon and 
Hwang 2013).  
 How have East Asian presidents adjusted their cabinet appointments to handle the 
responsiveness versus competence trade-off in a transitional bureaucracy? To investigate the 
process, I sought the views of cabinet members who served in different ministries across 
presidential administrations in South Korea. 21  Insights from these interviews reveal factors 
contributing to the way individual ministers are considered and selected in the Korean context. 
First, in the prescreening process, a list of finalists is prepared for a given post, and presidents 
select candidates whose political ideology and policy positions are compatible with theirs. In 
meritocratic bureaucracies, political appointments are often characterized by hybrid 
appointments where merit is accompanied by subjective political judgments.22 Many senior civil 
servants in South Korea are vetted through a multi-step process where the president reviews 
"whether a candidate's political beliefs and policy preferences fall in the acceptable range" (Lee, 
Moon, and Hahm 2010, 82S). A set of biographical, familial, and educational backgrounds is 
used as a part of such judgments.23 Once chosen, presidents expect ministers with civil service 
backgrounds to smoothly control highly professional personnel groups in the bureaucratic 
organization as lower-level bureaucrats will be more amenable to their senior careerists.24
                                                          
21  Specifically, of the 15 ministers I contacted, 10 ministers responded. I do not claim that this sample is 
representative of all cabinet members, but maintain that it is not too small a cohort to derive useful insights. The 
interviewees are listed in the appendix.  
 Head 
22 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-
1345485407865/Recruitment.pdf (accessed May 15, 2017). 
23 Interview, Korea, September 13 (Choo, Byung-jik), 2013. 
24 Interviews, Korea, September 13 (Choo, Byung-jik) and September 16 (Song, Min-soon), 2013.  
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of ministry posts are perceived typically as jobs for senior civil servants who share the 
president's policy orientation.  
 In the case of Taiwan's merit-based civil service, party influence on its executive 
organization has been more permeable than that of Korean civil service. Through this influence, 
presidents facing distrustful bureaucrats have made strategic personnel choices to enhance their 
claims of accountability. In 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took control of 
the government with the election of Chen Shui-bian, the DPP government doubted the veracity 
of incumbent bureaucrats' accountability to the new party leadership after their decades of civil 
service under the Kuomintang (KMT). To make the national bureaucracy more loyal and 
responsive to the DPP administration, Chen deliberately reshuffled the bureaucratic hierarchy by 
promoting bureau heads and lower ranking government officials to positions as department heads 
or ministers, some of whom were later recruited as DPP members.25
 In contrast with South Korea and Taiwan, Philippine presidents typically find a pool of 
executive talent from outside the civil service, as witnessed from the Aquino administration's 
massive substitution of business personnel for incumbent bureaucrats (Baum 2011). Without 
much autonomy from political pressures, the Philippine bureaucracy retains few careerists who 
 The personnel reshuffle was 
one way of earning loyalty from promoted civil servants and replacing the previously KMT-
dominated system with DPP people. When the KMT returned to power with the election of Ma 
Ying-jeou in 2008, the new administration again showed distrust of incumbent civil servants and 
accused them of partisan bias (Su 2010). President Ma selectively appointed senior civil servants 
to his cabinet and brought back some former ministers and government officials who served in 
the KMT administration more than eight years prior.  
                                                          
25 Interview, Taiwan, October 21 (Wu, Yu-shan), 2013. 
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can reach top executive positions. Instead, Philippine ministers are frequently selected from 
among external professionals such as professors, business leaders, or legal advisors.  
 Similarly, presidents in Indonesia generally seek a pool of competence necessary for the 
administration from outside the civil service. A few departments whose public personnel 
administration is relatively well-institutionalized, such as foreign policy and finance ministries, 
see their leaders promoted to top executive positions, but these are rather exceptional cases as the 
quality is not consistent across ministries.26
 
 Many of Indonesian ministers have major careers in 
academia, business, or even the military prior to their appointment. In Table 3, I present major 
careers of nonpartisan ministers from outside the bureaucracy across presidential administrations 
in the Philippines and Indonesia since democratic transition. The centrality of competence to the 
president's appointment mechanism for controlling bureaucrats is reflected in the pattern of 
cabinet appointments in both cases. As shown in Table 3, the majority of nonpartisan ministers 
in Philippine and Indonesian cabinets were professors or business leaders. Combined with legal 
advisors and security forces commanders, they took about a 90 percent share.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 In sum, my analyses suggest that bureaucratic quality has a significant impact on the 
executive appointment of cabinet ministers, even controlling for several political and partisan 
factors that affect presidential strategy for choosing ministers. In particular, a professionalized 
bureaucracy can enlarge the pool of talented personnel within the civil service, resulting in 
increased promotions to top executive posts of senior civil servants who are ideologically aligned 
with presidents. In the case of a politicized system, it provides for presidential discretion in 
                                                          
26 Interviews, Indonesia, June 4 (Hamid Awaluddin), 2013 and June 13 (Juwono Sudarsono), 2013. 
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directly controlling bureaucrats through political interference, leading to a growing recruitment 
of external experts from outside the civil service. These findings have significant implications for 
the state capacity of East Asian democracies, showing the value of carrying out administrative 
reforms and balancing between political responsiveness and administrative competence. These 
characteristics not only affect policy implementation with the civil service but also have an 
important impact on the advancement of a president's broader policy concerns and the public 
interest.  
 
Conclusion 
The comparative literature on government formation demonstrates that a majority of cabinet 
members in presidential democracies typically have no affiliation with political parties and tend 
to have diverse backgrounds (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). 
These attributes are also common in East Asia, where most democracies have popularly elected 
presidents. Specifically, professors are popular candidates for cabinet posts, but the presence of 
civil servants as ministers shows wide cross-country variation among East Asian democracies. 
Here, I suggest that the choice of cabinet ministers is determined in a dimension beyond 
legislative strategy, exploring an administrative dimension by focusing on key institutional 
features of the civil service system. How civil servants are recruited and promoted in the 
bureaucratic apparatus affects presidential incentives to appoint cabinet ministers to whom they 
delegate authority to monitor and control civil servants. Faced with professionalized systems, 
characterized by a sizable pool of talent but a low degree of responsiveness, presidents can 
choose ministers from the civil service by promoting senior careerists who are ideologically 
aligned with them. In politicized systems, wherein presidents easily obtain responsiveness but 
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face a low level of internal competence, they seek to appoint policy experts from outside the 
bureaucracy. While I uncover strong evidence of hybrid appointments where objective merit is 
accompanied by subjective political judgments in professionalized bureaucracies, I am unable to 
determine whether senior civil servants that were promoted into ministers were all presidents' 
loyalists. Additional information on individual ministers' policy positions and their ties to the 
president would do much to further illuminate the appointment mechanisms for controlling 
bureaucrats (see e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2011).   
 This article makes some important contributions to the literature on comparative politics 
and presidential studies, which may travel beyond East Asia. First, my analysis demonstrates 
how presidents employ cabinet resources to control bureaucrats and manage their delegation 
concerns in policy implementation. The comparative literature on cabinet formation in 
presidential democracies has focused mainly on a president's legislative strategy, largely 
overlooking the administrative dimension of cabinet choices. My research speaks to the 
emerging literature on the role of nonpartisans in government and contributes a new approach – 
the appointment mechanism for agency control. Second, by analyzing East Asian presidential 
democracies, which are largely understudied cases in the comparative literature, this article 
contributes new evidence to the debate over political control of bureaucracy beyond the context 
of American politics. In particular, my analysis confirms the importance of bureaucratic 
variables to more precisely infer the factors shaping bureaucratic action and to properly explain 
the administrative process (Meier and O'Toole 2006). In analyzing presidential efforts to control 
the bureaucracy and helping to understand the role of cabinet appointments, future research 
should seek to not only examine whether each of the four East Asian cases demonstrates 
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different trajectories of democratic development through in-depth case studies but also expand 
the number of cases by applying this mechanism to other democracies in Asia and beyond.  
 Alternatively, other future research agendas exist for scholars of executive control of 
bureaucracy. One area is to investigate whether the appointment patterns presented in this study 
hold across different agencies in presidential democracies. Research on cabinet appointments 
suggests that portfolio allocations help chief executives to fulfill their particular goals and 
incentives. Yet, the literature on portfolio allocations is still underdeveloped for presidential 
democracies. Future research on this subject will further improve our understanding of the 
appointment mechanism for agency control. Another area is applying the appointment 
mechanism I present in this paper to bureaucrats at the local level and examining its 
effectiveness. In delegating policy implementation, containing the risk of agency loss is a major 
concern for governors as well as for presidents. Future research that examines the relationship 
between institutional characteristics of bureaucracy and patterns of political appointments in 
state governments will similarly make important contributions to the study of state politics and 
local governance.  
 Additionally, future work on the impact of some variation in appointment patterns across 
countries and over time will have important implications for the quality of governance and the 
consolidation of democracy. My analysis suggests that cabinet appointments can provide flexible 
options to enhance responsiveness or organizational competence for chief executives to handle 
this common trade-off. Yet, experts who are selected from within the civil service and outside of 
it may perform differently. Anecdotal evidence from the developing world indicates that non-
civil service experts perform in a more corrupt way than their civil service counterparts. Further 
research on this subject will tell whether there is any systematic relationship between experts' 
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career backgrounds and their performance, which might leave politicized bureaucracies more 
vulnerable to producing crummy patronage-based cabinets.  
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FIGURE 1. Delegation Mechanisms under Parliamentary and Presidential Democracy 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Shugart (2006), Strøm (2000). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Proportion of Ministers from Civil Service across Administrations, by Country 
 
 
Note: *incumbent as of December 2013. 
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FIGURE 3. Quality of Bureaucracy and Proportion of Ministers from Civil Service  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
ICRG Ratings 88 0.57 0.17 0.17 0.85 
Rauch & Evans Index 74 1.32 0.29 0.96 1.67 
Constitutional Powers 88 17.32 4.27 9.00 21.50 
Presidents' Support in Legislature 87 0.44 0.18 0.10 0.75 
Electoral Cycle 88 36.12 18.09 1.35 71 
Term Limits 80 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Inflation 88 4.77 3.59 -0.65 18.50 
Age of democracy 88 12.10 7.25 1 27 
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TABLE 2. Analysis of Data on Ministers from Civil Service in Presidential Cabinets 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable 
Proportion: 
Ministers 
from Civil 
Service 
Proportion: 
Ministers 
from Civil 
Service 
Choice: 
Ministers 
from Civil 
Service 
Choice: 
Ministers 
from Civil 
Service 
Bureaucracy Quality     
  ICRG Ratings 0.230**  1.040*  
 (0.102)  (0.586)  
  Rauch & Evans Index  0.374***  2.071*** 
  (0.028)  (0.517) Control Variables     
  Constitutional Powers 0.009 0.032*** 0.179*** 0.248*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.034) (0.039) 
  Presidents' Support  0.181 0.215 0.823 0.610 
        in Legislature (0.133) (0.149) (0.668) (0.681) 
  Electoral Cycle -0.002 -0.001 -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Term Limits -0.028 -0.031** -0.206 -0.200 
 (0.026) (0.014) (0.239) (0.265) 
  Inflation -0.001 -0.0001 -0.103*** -0.032 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.043) 
  Age of democracy -0.0003 0.005** -0.007 0.023 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.015) Constant -0.087 -0.982*** -4.523*** -8.641*** 
 (0.090) (0.195) (0.788) (1.326) Obs (groups) 79 (4) 70 (3) 1090 (4) 996 (3) 
Wald χ2 34.79 311.15 68.72 87.41 
Pr > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
For Models 1 and 2, dependent variables are proportions of ministers from the civil service. Estimates produced 
using general linear models with first-order autocorrelation correction. The unit of analysis is a country-year.  
For Models 3 and 4, dependent variables are coded 1 if minister is from the civil service. Estimates produced using 
logistic regression models. The unit of analysis is an individual minister.  
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FIGURE 4. Predicted Effect of the Quality of Bureaucracy on Presidential Appointments of 
Ministers from Civil Service 
 
 
 
 
Note: Estimated values with 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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TABLE 3. Major Careers of Nonpartisan Ministers from Outside the Civil Service across 
Administrations, Philippines and Indonesia 
 
  Professors 
Business 
Leaders 
Military /  
Police 
Legal 
Advisors 
Journalists 
& Others Total 
Philippines 
      Aquino 11 13 3 9 5 41 
 (1986-1992) (26.8%) (31.7%) (7.3%) (22.0%) (12.2%) (100%) 
Ramos 11 13 4 7 3 38 
(1992-1998) (28.9%) (34.2%) (10.5%) (18.4%) (7.9%) (100%) 
Estrada 10 5 0 2 1 18 
(1998-2001) (55.6%) (27.8%) (0.0%) (11.1%) (5.6%) (100%) 
Arroyo  21 12 9 8 2 52 
(2001-2010) (40.4%) (23.1%) (17.3%) (15.4%) (3.8%) (100%) 
Aquino III*  5 9 1 4 1 20 
(2010-2013) (25.0%) (45.0%) (5.0%) (20.0%) (5.0%) (100%) 
Total 58 52 17 30 12 169 
  (34.3%) (30.8%) (10.1%) (17.8%) (7.1%) (100%) 
Indonesia 
      Wahid  7 4 9 1 3 24 
(1999-2001) (29.2%) (16.7%) (37.5%) (4.2%) (12.5%) (100%) 
Megawati  3 1 4 1 2 11 
(2001-2004) (27.3%) (9.1%) (36.4%) (9.1%) (18.2%) (100%) 
SBY*  19 8 3 1 3 34 
(2004-2013) (55.9%) (23.5%) (8.8%) (2.9%) (8.8%) (100%) 
Total 29 13 16 3 8 69 
  (42.0%) (18.8%) (23.2%) (4.3%) (11.6%) (100%) 
*Incumbent as of December 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
